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criminal, or at most possesses as little power of salvation within himself, as he who will not destroy his own deed when it is negative.

Moreover, this play stands alone in the fact that it quite touches the very limits of the drama itself. For the essence of the drama is to portray some form of action, but here that form is non-action. Hence the plan of the play and the necessity for those external circumstances which were detailed in a previous essay; for they must be external, since the character is passive. This work is thus the culmination of Shakspeare's poetical activity, and exhibits the broadest range of his genius. The rest of his dramas depict collisions of various kinds, but it is the nature of the collision to be between higher and lower forms of Will. But here he quite sweeps the whole field of the Will and makes it one of the colliding principles. He thus produces the most comprehensive of all dramas, and seems to exhaust the very possibilities of dramatic Art.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

Under this title we propose to introduce from time to time a variety of Philosophical miscellany possessing interest from its personal character or from its bearing on particular movements of the time. Scraps of correspondence, extracts from periodicals or books recently published, criticisms or strictures on articles published in this journal, short editorials, discussions of the methods, subjects and results of Speculative Philosophy, and of systems hostile to it,—these and like matters will find their place hereafter in this journal under the above heading. The attention of our readers is called to this “new departure,” and their assistance solicited in making it an attractive and valuable feature of this journal.

The authorship of the several “notes and discussions” will be indicated by the signatures. EDITOR.

PROOFS OF IMMORTALITY.

Our strictures on Mr. Kroeger's remarks regarding the proofs of immortality (p. 91, Jour. Spec. Phil. for Jan. 1873), in his notice of Prof. Schliephake's article in the *Neue Zeit*, has drawn out the two following communications.—ED.

FROM MR. EMERY.

Editor of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy:

You have somewhere quoted the saying of Novalis, "Though Philosophy can bake no bread, yet she can procure for us God, Freedom, and Immortality." Your reply to Mr. Kroeger's remarks in the January number of the *Journal* would indicate that you believe Philosophy "can procure for us" the immortality of the individual *as* individual. Does this necessarily follow from the recognition of our essential immortality? The question of individual immortality, as Mr. Kroeger puts it, is, whether this bundle of experiences, held together by memory, which we call the soul of Tom, Dick, or Harry, will continue to live forever. Certainly this is not an empirical question, neither can it be answered empirically. Admit that one individual, once dead, has reappeared; does that prove anything as to other individuals, or as to a second death? Admit the affirmation of the "individual, empirical self-consciousness of an immortal will"; would that necessarily be anything more than a subjective fancy? Mr. Kroeger evidently means that the immortality of the individual cannot be proven at all, therefore it is idle to waste words about the matter. Your reply, however, insists upon the importance of answering the question *a priori*, and it certainly can be and ought to be so answered.

From your allusion to Mr. Kroeger's mistake, it must be inferred, that any one who appreciates fully "the significance of the category of Universality when applied to human consciousness" must see individual immortality; but Fichte, whom you quote as having properly characterized the "essence of reason," says (pp. 38 & 39 January Nö. Jour.), "We, therefore, utterly repudiate the separation of the individual into body and soul, and the composition of the individual out of these two pieces; a doctrine which perhaps even asserts that the soul alone will continue to exist after the decease of the body. * * * * The existence of a soul is, therefore, absolutely denied, and the whole conception of a soul repudiated as a miserable poetical invention." Is it not plain, then, that while Fichte appreciated the "essence of reason," he denied the immortality of the individual? Mr. Kroeger certainly did not intend to say that Reason could be except as person, or could exist except as individual. He intended only to intimate the unessentiality of any particular individual Tom, Dick, or Harry. Is there, then, any substantial difference between Fichte, Mr. Kroeger, and yourself? Is not this soul of Tom, Dick, or Harry, *considered as individual*, a growth of Time, and does it not partake of the finitude common to all things of Time? Do you mean that an investigation "of the determinations of the idea of Universality" will enable one to solve affirmatively the problem of individual immortality? If you do, ought you not to make your statement more explicit?

Quincy, Ills., April, 1873.

SAM. H. EMERY, JR.

FROM MR. KROEGER.

Editor of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy:

I have been requested to state, in the *most condensed shape*, my views of the proofs of immortality. In doing so, I desire to say in advance, that, in

denying the possibility of any other than a practical proof of immortality, I no more intend to deny immortality itself, than by denying the possibility of proving to any individual his existence by any other than a practical proof, I intend to deny his actual existence. It is simply because I deem it an inconsiderate waste of time, leading into a labyrinth of errors from which it is next to impossible to escape, that I oppose idle speculations on these subjects; and must needs hold the man who calls upon a philosopher to prove him his immortality, quite as foolish as the man who wants me to prove to him that he exists, or that he is free. To attempt such impossible proofs makes philosophy the laughing-stock of all who are naturally its opposers and enemies. Philosophy has, in my opinion, a far higher object than this.

I insist, therefore, that the only proof of immortality is as follows:

1. I feel myself impelled at every moment of my life to act or not-act in a certain manner, utterly regardless of the impulses of my physical nature and quite often in direct opposition to those impulses, which mode of acting is called moral acting; and could not feel myself so impelled did not the impulsion demand complete, absolute subjection to its dictate.

2. No individual can attain this complete and absolute subjection except at the completion of an infinite time.

3. Hence I cannot act morally at all unless I postulate for myself an infinite continuance of my individual life.

And I further insist that all other proofs of a theoretical or speculative character are based upon a fallacy, which may very concisely be expounded in this way:

Form of all Speculative Proofs of Immortality.

1. Substance is permanent.
2. I am a substance:
3. Hence I am immortal.

The fallacy lies in assuming the "permanent" of the major to be identical with the "immortal" of the conclusion, which it is not. If the major were to read, Substance is immortal, the syllogism would be correct; but of substance you cannot predicate immortality, *since the latter conception is attributable only to beings that have a beginning in time and pass through a physical death.*

The permanency of the substance, however, which in the above syllogism might be assigned to me in the conclusion, is not worth anything for purposes of immortality; seeing that it is no permanency in time and space, but simply of the idea of substance as the thought of the unity of accidents.

Every speculative proof of Immortality has this same failing of an assumption, the unjustifiable nature of which too often escapes superficial minds. I will undertake to show it up in every proof brought forward.

While engaged in this somewhat unscientific declaration of faith, I may be permitted to add the following:

To speak about the question of immortality as an insoluble problem, or to speak about any question as an insoluble problem, is sheerest stupidity. Whatever problem reason propounds is either reasonable and hence solva-

ble, or else absurd. To a man of sense there is no darkness whatever in any region of knowledge, but only purest clearness. If there seems to be darkness, be sure it is of your own making. It is most certainly unknowable whether tomorrow will find me here or there on this earth, and in proportion it is equally unknowable whether tomorrow will find me a living resident on earth or elsewhere. But it were absurd for me to ask for the solution of the latter problem as if it ought to be more answerable than the former. A man of sense, and a philosopher, will ask for the solution of neither problem, but await the morrow to bring it.

If, however, the problem be put in the shape as to whether tomorrow will find me a living resident anywhere—as to whether I am an immortal, deathless being—the answer is equally ready at hand, that to me as an agent of the moral world, as a “citizen of the city of God,” in the words of Leibnitz and St. Augustine, the predicates of death and mortality are not applicable at all. I cannot die. This body may perish, as it does, indeed, every day; but a new one *must* be given me. Take the smallest pebble out of the physical universe and the whole physical universe collapses. Take me, the smallest moral agent in the moral world, out of it, and the whole kingdom of God plunges into nothingness.

St. Louis, Mo., April, 1873.

A. E. KROEGER.

REMARKS BY THE EDITOR.

The practical proof of immortality—to wit, the *presupposition* thereof by all human institutions through which man becomes a distinctively *human* being and a somewhat higher than a brute animal—this practical proof is indeed strong enough to whosoever appreciates it in its full force. We heartily sympathize with Mr. Kroeger in the living faith which he expresses; and likewise with any one who believes in immortality on whatever grounds—the more rational the grounds, the deeper our sympathy. But knowledge is better than faith, and in this instance it is better to see the “universality and necessity of grounds” than merely their dependance upon something else whose true justification is to be sought in the doctrine for which we seek proofs. For, after all, it is immortality that justifies institutions and not the latter the former. The skeptic attacks institutions effectively with his denial of immortality, and his attack precludes the use of the practical argument on the ground of the “*petitio*.” The spiritual nature of man must be established from more general grounds in order to satisfy the doubter. If one sees the “universality and necessity” of the “moral world” as Mr. Kroeger does, he sees immortality as a corollary; but otherwise the practical proof is a vicious circle.

Mr. Emery restates his question in a letter before us: “Can Freedom and Immortality be found on the plane of the Particular, or only on the plane of the Universal? Is there anything free or immortal about the individual man except the ‘I am I’ of universal self-consciousness?” In this quotation the terms Universal, Particular, and Individual, are used in such a way as to reveal the source of confusion in the author’s mind. So long as a particular or individual is conceived *apart* from the universal, so long it is conceived as lacking substantiality or permanency.

When one rises to the conception of the *concrete* universal, he conceives the same as a self-related negative process which contains particularity as a phase or "moment" of it, and which process as a whole is well named *individual*. The universal which is a mere "general" or abstract somewhat is not this concrete universal at all. Plato knew it, and still better did Aristotle; and the one object kept always in view by them in their works is the exhibition of this concrete universal (as Hegel has shown: see *Jour. Spec. Phil.*, vol. iv., p. 321, and vol. v., p. 74). The concrete universal is the vital principle of all speculative philosophy, although it is a veritable Proteus in concealing itself under different forms. Leibnitz's monads essentially express it; they each represent the entire universe. Spinoza's substance, notwithstanding it has been judged by the principle "*omnis negatio*," &c., and declared to be an abstract universal, still contains pure activity, and is therefore a concrete universal in the highest sense of the term. Part fifth of "The Ethics" ought to make clear to the dullest reader of philosophy that Spinoza was a sound Aristotelian (with a Stoic direction), and that immortality and the personality of God were looked upon by him as the highest doctrines of his Philosophy. (See *Ethics*, Part V., Prop. XXIII. and Schol. XXV., XXIX., XXXI., and Schol. XXXIV., XXXV., XXXVI. and coroll., and Schol. XL. & XLI.) Descartes's "perfect being" contains his aperçu of the self-determined totality, the concrete universal.

Mr. Kroeger's reduction of the general *form* of all speculative proofs of immortality fails in the fact that he assumes that the idea of substance remains as abstract at the close of the demonstration as at the beginning. "Substance is permanent" may mean that some abstract category or negative unity, like Matter or Force or Vitality, is permanent. When substance is found by an exhaustive dialectical procedure to be *subject*, or, in other words, when it is discovered that no category or mode of Being or Essence is adequate to independent subsistence unless it be thinking Being—conscious personality—then the conclusion "immortal" may be substituted for the less specific "permanent" of the premise. The proof that "permanent" as predicate of substance necessarily means "immortal" because of the identity of true substance with mind need not here be undertaken, because so often and so variously accomplished by different systems of Philosophy from Plato and Aristotle down to Hegel. (In this *Journal* see vol. iv., pp. 97 et seq.; vol. i., pp. 62, 119, 120, 187, 188.) What is required here is a further examination of the empirical relation of the historical individual, Dick or Harry, to the personality recognized by speculative philosophy as the highest principle. (See pp. 109–10, vol. iv. *Jour. Spec. Phil.*) In ourselves we find the "I am I" which Mr. Emery mentions. To say nothing of the presuppositions of the moral world, that form the "practical" proof which convinces Mr. Kroeger, there are presuppositions far more intimate—those of language, for example—and most unequivocal, the presupposition of Consciousness itself. The individual Dick or Harry is conscious of himself: here is the empirical basis, an empirical basis, however, which is likewise rational or *a priori*. For in the act of self-consciousness one realizes his identity with pure universality or Ego in general, inasmuch as his very

act of reflection upon himself is possible only through his exercise of absolute negative might, i.e. the cancelling of every particular determination of thought as such, and the spontaneous seizing of its own negative act as object. Thus self-consciousness is a perception and realization of absoluteness, an identifying of one's infinite particularity or personality with absolute universality (or active negation of determinations). This negative might of the universal is precisely what gives us our particular individuality, our certainty that we are independent self-subsisting entities.

Now a theory that held to a general persistence of consciousness in Humanity without individual immortality would fall into the same category with those theories that hold an abstract unity, a "negative unity," as the first principle. The general critique of the same is as follows: Force or Matter is a negative unity or an abstract category which is reached through the annulment of all special determinations or particular forms of matter or force. No particular form of matter or of force is adequate to the expression of the generality of matter or force. Hence each particular shape or form gives way to other potentialities and the particular perishes. The abstract highest principle when realized annuls the individual. But the dialectic of this annulment of individuals through their inadequacy to realize the abstract universal does not cease with the highest principle; it, too, is found inadequate; it is one side of an antithesis, and over against it is its realization. Since its complete attainment is its removal from reality altogether and thus the negation of its own activity, it can in no wise be a self-subsistent entity such as the highest principle should be. Whereupon it is clear that such abstract universal is only a phase of a higher or more concrete totality. It is a phase of a negative movement which returns to itself in every act of determination by which it gives rise to the particular. Thus all its forms are transparent, and it is self-determined and self-conscious. Self-consciousness underlies as a profounder presupposition the "Correlation of Forces." But what is the relation of the individual to self-consciousness? To the absolute or creative self-consciousness such particular somewhats as are not conscious are *quasi* individuals, and they originate or are annulled without persistence. They abide only in their purpose or "final cause." But to the conscious individual there is persistence for the reason that he is his own negative unity. The negative unity is outside individual things but inside conscious individuals. From the fact that conscious individuals are their own negative unity, they alone can remove their inadequateness to the generic or highest principle—of which all particular existence is but the realization. An external negative unity destroys the particular and it perishes; an internal negative unity lives in the very act of destroying its own particularity; this life is a process of development, and more than this, a spiritual growth. To a being that can progress by the removal of its own limitations, there is no higher finite being or stage of existence. He already transcends time and space, and is lord over them in his negative might as subject, although his determinations as results (*natura naturata*) are in time and space. The form of Recognition is, then, the form of relation between individual spirits and the Absolute Spirit. (See "Comprehension and Idea," Jour. Spec. Phil., vol. i.,

pp. 236-38.) The true monad is impenetrable by all else and unassailable. The rest of the universe exists for it only through its own proper activity, its "representation" of the same to itself. Nothing exists for the conscious being unless through its own activity. To realize in itself adequately the universe, to annul its own inadequacy, is its immortal task.

To suppose an Absolute Self-consciousness that created or posited conscious beings in order to reflect Itself in them, and then to cancel them in death, is to suppose a consciousness that failed adequately to realize itself, that could not attain to complete reflection into itself, and hence that failed of complete self-consciousness. For the only thing necessary to be fully understood here in order to see the utter impossibility of such a theory as we suppose, is the nature of consciousness as a form of reflection into itself through recognition. The reflection into itself must be mutual in order to be at all. The highest category of Philosophy, The IDEA, is that of mutuality as prevailing in Absolute Self-determination—the mystery of the Trinity when stated in the language of Religion.

Therefore a general Reason which swallowed up, like Saturn, its particular realizations, would, through the fact that it could act externally as negative unity on the particular individual, absolutely preclude the possibility of reflecting itself in the particular individual, for such reflection must necessarily demand free individuals who are their own negative unity. Hence such an external Reason would of necessity be unconscious, and hence not its own negative unity; but this is impossible, as the dialectic proves. Therefore the existence of conscious beings is of necessity the existence of immortal beings.

BOOK NOTICES.

Programm des Gymnasiums zu Meldorf, etc. Meldorf: 1873.

This Programme contains an able article discussing the question, "What reforms appear to be necessary in the present *status* and functions of Evangelical religious instruction in the Gymnasia?"

Im Lande der Denker! Philosophische Abhandlung bezüglich einer Neugestaltung unseres Culturideals. Von Moritz Müller. Zweite Ausgabe. Berlin: 1873.

In the first part of this volume the author discusses with his usual vigor the question of "Latin instruction in our common schools, and the honor paid to Greek and Roman culture." He quotes the remark of Oerstedt, "that general culture could be best obtained through an extensive study of the various branches of science and through a more intimate study of the mother-tongue, combined with a familiar and accurate acquaintance with foreign living languages." The remark of Schopenhauer should be quoted alongside: "A man who does not understand Latin is like one who walks through a beautiful region in a fog; his horizon is very close to him. He sees only the nearest things clearly, and a few steps away from him the